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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA M. HOVE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHNS. Mc.MASTER, D.D.S., and 
HIGHLAND DENTAL CLINIC, INC., 
a professional corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16850 
As stated in the Appellant's Brief this is an action 
for damages resulting from an alleged act of dental malprac-
tice. The only issue before the Court is whether the Appel-
lant's claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations contained 
in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, §78-14-4, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) . 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
Again as stated in the Appellant's Brief this action 
was bifurcated and the only issue tried by the Court below 
was whether or not the Appellant failed to commence her action 
against the Resdpondents within two years from the date on 
which she knew, or should have known, that she had sustained 
an injury and that said injury was caused by the Respondent, 
John S. McMaster, D.D.S. The Court resolved this issue of 
fact in favor of the Respondents, that is, that Appellant did 
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fail to commence her action against the Respondents within two 
years from the date on which she knew, or should have known, 
that she had sustained an injury and, based on that finding, 
held that the plaintiff's action was barred by the foregoing 
Statute of Limitations. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to affirm the Findings of the Court 
in the trial below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the Appellant's 
Brief, as to the chronology of the event is correct. However, 
the statement simply glosses over or fails to point out that 
evidence in the record which sustains the Findings of the 
Trial Court. It was agreed at the outset of the trial below, 
for the purposes of that trial, that the injury of which the 
Appellant complained occurred during the course of dental 
treatment administered by Dr. McMaster on February 27, 1974 
(Tr. 6-10), and that the Appellant had two years from the date 
she knew, or should have known, of the injury in which to 
file her action. All of the evidence was therefore directed 
toward the issue of when the Appellant knew, or should have 
known, that she had suffered a legal injury. 
The Appellant is a resident of Cleveland, Ohio, where 
she moved after the graduation of her husband from law school 
at the University of Utah (Tr. 21). She was born in Albany, 
New York, and attended high school in Albany. After high 
school she attended several schools, eventually receiving a 
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a degree in nursing at Albany Memorial Hospital in Albany, 
New York, which qualified her as a registered nurse. From 
there she attended Boston University where she received a 
Bachelor of Science in Nursing Science (Tr .. 14). While 
attending the University she worked at the Student Health 
Clinic and the U.S. Public Service Hospital in Boston (T~. 15), 
and has since spent several months working in hospitals as 
a nurse. As a nurse she is qualified to make injections of 
drugs into the human body (Tr. 17), and has been taught how to 
make injections so as not to interfere with a nerve (Tr. 18). 
More specifically she has been taught the consequences of making 
an injection directly into a nerve (Tr. 18), one of which 
is that the person who was receiving the injection would suffer 
a shocking sensation which she described as "more in the sense 
of hitting your elbow, your funny bone and getting a shocking 
sensation" (Tr. 19) . 
On February 27, 1974, the Appellant went to see Dr. 
McMaster, a dentist, for the purpose of having a cavity filled. 
She was given two injections. At the time of the second in-
jection the Appellant testified that she recalled the doctor 
pushing his needle in and it hit something hard; 
"And then he kept pushing it and 
then it seemed to give way and hit 
something soft and when it did I 
got this shock in my face and I 
said, awe, awe, awe, which is about 
all I could say with my mouth open". 
(Tr. 24). 
When asked to equate her experience as a nurse and 
the shock suffered by patients when an injection is made into 
- 3 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a nerve as to whether that was the kind of shock she felt she 
answered, "I would say it would be fair to say, a similar 
type". (Tr. 24). She described the sensation as feeling the 
medication being injected, it felt as if it traveled toward 
her nose and then went under her eye. She had a slight burn-
ing sensation and then it all went numb. (Tr. 25). 
It took her a long time to get the sensation in 
her face back (Tr. 27). When it did come back she was left 
with the sensation of feeling that her face and nose were 
plugged up. She had tingling off and on for the next six 
months, had a sense of pressure behind the right eye, and had 
half a dozen blood shot eyes over the same period (Tr. 28). 
She stated she knew something was wrong, something felt funny. 
She did not attribute it specifically to that injection but 
she did relate it specifically to the visit she had with 
Dr. McMaster on February 27, 1974, which is when she stated 
her problem seemed to start. (Tr. 29). 
The Appellant then states that her condition calmed 
down for a while and then after a few months it would flare 
up again (Tr. 30). In February of 1975, she stated, referring 
to the periods of time when her symptoms would flare up, 
Well, as I said, I kept having them on 
and off so I thought something wasn't 
right and Dr. McMaster said he couldn't 
find anything and I suggested, well, I 
think I ought to go see a neurologist 
and he said, yes, that might not be a 
bad idea and he said, do you want me to 
recommend one and I said that I had one 
in mind (Tr. 30). 
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The doctor she selected was a Dr. Wayne Hebertson, 
whom she saw on February 24, 1975. When asked if she had a 
discussion with Dr. Hebertson as to whether the injection 
caused her problem she testified, "I may have asked him if 
it did because I was - what I was looking for is why I was 
having the problem and treatment."(Tr. 31). 
Dr. Hebertson's deposition was published during the 
course of trial. He testified that he is a board certified 
neurologist (Tr. 69). 
Appellant gave Dr. Hebertson a history of the dental 
procedure and the numbness which gradually went away. He 
testified that about two weeks prior to his examination the 
Appellant noted an onset of pain above the right cheek bone, 
tingling below the right eye, her right ear felt plugged and 
her right eye was tired. It was the doctor's opinion that the 
complaints which he observed in Mrs. Hove could certainly 
reflect some involvement of the facial nerves or other facial 
structures such as a jaw joint (Tr. 70). He discussed his 
diagnostic impressions with her which were: 
"That she could have local infec-
tion of the facial nerves such as 
one might get with shingles. Also 
whether it might represent some comp-
lication of her prior dental injections 
and/or her dental surgery. Whether 
she may have some arthritic condition 
in the jaw joints and/or some other 
dental source of pain in her mouth 
and j aw. " (Tr. 71) . 
Thereafter, she continued to visit various doctors 
and dentists, each time relating the history of the injection 
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and soliciting their opinions as to whether or not that was 
causing her problem. Dr. Wayne Provost, a dentist, testified 
he saw her in September of 1975, and at that time she asked 
him about the burning sensation and pain she had on the right 
side of her face and if it could be due to a dental injection. 
The doctor at that time told her he thought it was unlikely 
(Tr. 58) . 
She saw a Glen K. Lund, M.D., a ear, nose and throat 
specialist, to whom she related that she had pain in her face 
on the right side and some nasal obstruction on the same side 
and that she dated this back to the time when she had an in-
jection for a dental procedure. The doctor felt she had a 
nasal obstruction on the right side but could not see the 
source of pain. He did think she might have atypical facial 
neuralgia which might be due to remote ·injection. It does 
not appear that he discussed it with her but did recommend 
that she see a neurologist (Tr. 63-64). The Appellant did 
see a neurologist, Dr. Leonard Jarcho, who practices at the 
University of Utah Medical Center. The Appellant gave him a 
history of a burning sensation on the right side of her face 
and said that in May 1974, she had both her wisdom teeth 
removed and right last molar filled, during which an injection 
hit a nerve near the nose and at that time she had shooting 
pain in her right upper jaw almost back on the ear with numb-
ness to the angle of the mouth and up to the skull (Tr. 73). 
The doctor thought it unlikely that her complaint of a burn-
ing sensation was an organic complaint. He found no evidence 
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of any injury to the nerve and no connection between the 
injection which she described in her history and her complaints 
when he examined her on April 26, 1977 (Tr. 74). 
The Appellant gave the same history to Dr. John 
Gardner in Cleveland, Ohio. Dr. Gardner's impression was that 
the plaintiff had atypical facial pain. He reported, "Seemingly 
its onset can be dated to needle trauma to what sounds like 
the maxillary nerve on the right side at the time of injection." 
ARGUMENT 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IN 
THE CASE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDINGS 
THAT THE ACTION OF THE CLAIMANT WAS 
NOT COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE 
DATE ON WHICH SHE KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE 
KNOWN THAT SHE SUFFERED A LEGAL INJURY. 
The issue in this case is not whether or not this 
Court may believe that the Appellant knew or should have known 
that she had a legal injury at least two years and ten months 
before she filed her notice of intent to sue, but whether the 
Trial Court could have so found on the basis of the evidence. 
In the case cited by the Appellant, in his brief, 
Hardy v. Hendrickson, this Court held that the evidence 
supported the Trial Court's reformation of a joint tenancy 
agreement, which reformation was based on findings of the Trial 
Court that the joint checking account was opened for the sole 
purpose of allowing a daughter to handle the business affairs 
of her incapacitated mother, without knowledge of the mother, 
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and that the daughter during her lifetime made no claim of 
ownership by reason of joint tenancy. This Court held: 
"On appeal the evidence is viewed 
in the light most favorable to 
sustain the lower court, and the 
findings will not be· disturbed 
unless they are clearly against 
the weight of the evidence or it 
manifestly appears that the court 
misapplied the law to the established 
facts." 
It should not be assumed from what has been set out 
in the Statement of Facts that Dr. John S. McMaster was 
guilty of malpractice and,except for the defense of the Statute 
of Limitations, the Appellant has a legal claim against the 
Respondents. Even the medical report of Dr. John Gardner, on 
which she apparently basis her claim, does not support this 
conclusion. 
Section 78-12-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"In any action against a physician 
and surgeon, dentist • . • for profes-
sional negligence or for rendering 
professional services without consent, 
if the responsive pleading of the de-
fendant pleads the action is barred by 
the statute of limitations, and if 
either party so moves the court, the 
issue raised thereby may be tried separately 
and before any other issues in the case 
are tried. If the issue raised by the 
defense of the statute of limitations 
is finally determined in favor of the 
plaintiff, the remaining issue shall 
then be tried." 
The Respondents simply elected to try the issue of 
whether or not the Appellant's action was barred by the Statute 
of Limitations before the issue of whether or not the Respondents 
were guilty of any act of malpractice was tried. 
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provides: 
Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
"No malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two 
years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever 
first occurs, but not to exceed four 
years after the date of the alleged 
act, omission, neglect, or occurrence 
II 
This Court in the case of Foil v. Ballinger, 601, 
P.2d 144, held that the statute begins to run when the injured 
person knows, or should know that he has suffered a legal injury. 
Therefore, it was assumed for purposes of the trial of this 
part of the case that the Respondents were guilty of malpractice, 
that is to say that the Appellant did suffer a legal injury, 
and the question was when did, or should the Appellant have 
discovered that injury. If we take one extreme, we could say 
the Appellant should have discovered the injury the moment 
the injection was made. If we take the other extreme, which 
seems to be the position taken by the Appellant's counsel 
in this case, we would say the action does not start to run 
until the person who feels that he has sustained a legal injury 
finds a witness who he believes will come into court and 
testify in his favor. Such a holding would render the two 
year statute meaningless because a person who felt he had 
sustained a legal injury could always wait two, three or up 
to four years before contacting an attorney or making any 
effort to substantiate his claims. 
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The Appellant in this case was a registered nurse who 
had gone beyond that stage and taken out a Bachelor of Science 
Degree in Nursing Science. She had worked in hospitals and 
other medical care facilities. She was trained in the proper 
method of making an injection and knew what might be expected 
to occur if an injection was made in such a manner as to injure 
a nerve. She describes the complaints which she had following 
the injection on February 24, 1974, as being similar to that 
which she would expect as a nurse if she had made an injection 
which damaged the nerve. It is submitted that it can there-
fore be argued that she knew at the time the injection was 
made, assuming it was made improperly, that she had suffered 
a legal injury. 
Thereafter, for six months, the plaintiff had a 
burning and tingling sensation in her face, suffered a half 
a dozen or more blood shot eyes and had a plugged up feeling 
in her nose and ears. It is submitted that any reasonable 
individual who has ever been to a dentist and had an injection 
would know that the reaction which the plaintiff had was not 
that which might reasonably be expected from an injection and 
that therefore the injection was made in an improper manner. 
However, we need not confine ourselves to what the 
plaintiff should have reasonably inferred by reason of her 
own knowledge and experience. One year after having received 
the injection she, on her own notion, went to a doctor of her 
own selection, Dr. Wayne Hebertson, who told her that her 
complaints, "might represent some complication of her prior 
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dental injections and/or her dental surgery." The doctor also 
told her that he thought the condition should be continued 
under observation in hopes that it might alleviate spontaneously 
and to contact him further if she had any persistence of her 
difficulty. She choose not to do so. 
Assuming that the Respondents were guilty of malpractice 
in this case, we need not ask ourselves the question as to 
when the Appellant should have known that she sustained a 
legal injury. She was apparently convinced of this from the 
outset. This is evidenced by the fact that every time she 
went to a doctor for dental treatment or any other purpose, 
one of the first questions that she always asked was whether 
or not her complaints could be related to an injection made 
in February of 1974. 
It is therefore submitted that the Statute of Limit-
ations in this case began to run when the plaintiff first formed 
this conclusion which might be as early as the date of the 
injection itself, when she had the unusual reaction to the 
injection which she described as being similar to that sus-
tained by a patient when an injection is made into a nerve. 
It surely was formed during the six months following the 
injection when she had the complications she claims following 
the injection such as the blood shot eye, tingling in her 
face and things of that nature. At the very latest the con-
clusion was formed when she went to Dr. Hebertson and related 
the history of the dental procedures and was informed by the 
doctor that her problem might represent some complication 
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of her prior dental injections and/or dental surgery. 
If we give the Appellant the benefit of the doubt, 
the statute did not begin to run until the date she saw the 
doctor on February 24, 1975. This was two years and ten months 
,.· 
prior to the time the notice of intent to commence an action 
was served on December 29, 1977, and three years before the 
Complaint was filed on February 22, 1978 (Tr. 53). 
It may be argued that the plaintiff should be given 
more time to develop testimony to substantiate her claims. The 
burden placed on the Appellant in this case is no different 
than the burden placed on the plaintiff in other civil actions. 
The person who believes he has been libele~ slandered or 
assualted, has only one year in which to determine to bring 
a lawsuit against the offender. In the case of wrongful death 
the plaintiff has two years, the same period of time as here, 
to do so. 
The attorney for the Appellant argues that the 
findings of the Trial Court is not supported by the evidence. 
He contradicts himself by the following admission found on page 
ten of his argument: "The evidence here is clear while Hove 
knew that she had a "problem" from the moment of the injection, 
for three and a half years thereafter she could obtain absolute~ 
no diagnosis that this "problem" was caused by negligence in 
that injection." 
The Appellant attempts to draw an analogy between 
the cases of Foil v. Ballinger and this case. It appears 
from reading the case of Foil v. Ballinger that that case is 
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an appeal from a summary judgment which was based on the alle-
gations of the complaint rather than on the evidence produced 
at a trial and the case was remanded for a determination as to 
when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged 
negligence giving rise to her injuries. The medical problem 
in Foil v. Ballinger concerned the administration of a permanent 
subarachnoid phenol block and was much more complicated than 
the medical problem in this case. Even so, the Court held that 
the Statute of Limitations would begin to run when the plaintiff 
in that case had an indication from a report to the State In-
dustrial Commission that her rectal and bladder problem of 
which she complained may have been caused by the administration 
of a subarachnoid phenol block. 
In the case of Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199 
436 P.2d 435, it does not appear that the plaintiff had any 
indication that a surgical needle had been left in his body 
during a surgical operation. Again this case was decided on 
a motion for summary judgment and again the Court held: 
"However, upon the record, it is 
our judgment that the question of 
whether or not the plaintiff com-
menced his action within four years 
after he knew, or should have known, 
of the presence of the surgical needle 
in his bodv is an issue to be resolved 
by the trier of the facts." 
In this case if we start with the assumption that the 
defendants were guilty of malpractice, it is clear the Appel-
lant, Hove, as stated in Appellant's Brief, knew that she 
had a"problem" from the moment of the injection and spent 
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three and a half years thereafter in trying to find a doctor 
who would so testify. Even if we assume that the Appellant 
did not know of the problem at the time of the injection, she 
knew as much after she had seen Dr. Hebertson one year after 
the injection, as she learned when she saw Dr. Gardner on 
October 21, 1977, when Dr. Hebertson discussed with her whether 
her problem might represent some complication of her prior 
dental surgery, injections or dental surgery which she chose 
not to follow up on. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case we have an Appellant with a Bachelor of 
Science Degree in Nursing Science and with special knowledge 
as to what complaints or symptoms might be expected from an 
injection in an improper manner into or near a nerve. If we 
believe the Appellant, on February 27, 1974, she received such 
an injection from the Respondent, John s. McMaster, and ex-
perienced the reaction which she testified might be expected 
under those circumstances. At that point, if we believe the 
Appellant, she knew she had a problem. She continued to 
experience difficulty for the next six months, at which time 
she claims that it subsided and then flared up for a period 
of time before she saw Dr. Hebertson, who informed her that 
her problem might be due to complications of her prior dental 
injections and/or dental surgery. Thereafter, the Appellant 
continued to see various doctors for the treatment of her 
various problems but in each instance inquired of them as to 
whether or not her problems related to an injection on February 
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27, 1974, which was made in a negligent manner, she was aware 
of this fact, if not at the time of the injection, at least 
within a year after the injection. Nevertheless, Appellant 
did not commence her lawsuit by the filing of a notice of intent 
to sue until December 29, 1977, over three years after the 
incident. On the basis of that evidence, the Trial Court found 
that the Appellant knew, or had reason to know, that she had 
suffered a legal injury over two years prior to the time that 
she commenced her action. Having so found, the Court dismissed 
her complaint under §78-14-4, which provides that, 
"No malpractice action may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, which-
ever first occurs." 
Though each of us may take a different view of the 
evidence, it does not appear that the findings of the Court 
are against the weight of the evidence or that the Court below 
misapplied the law to the established fact. In fact, viewed 
most favorably the evidence clearly supports the findings of 
the lower court. 
Some of us may feel that the period of time prescribed 
by the statute is too short and that it imposes too great a 
burden upon plaintiff. However, that is for the Legislature 
to determine and should not be determined by judicial fiat or 
by failing to enforce the statute. The Statute of Limitations 
in a medical malpractice case imposes no greater burden upon 
plaintiffs than do the Statutes of Limitations for many other 
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causes of action. In the field of medical malpractice the 
Legislature has simply determined that matters should be 
put to rest in a shorter period of time than in many other 
areas such as the statute applying to written contracts. 
--
It is submitted that the Findings of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this ~day of ~· 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & NELSON 
~~ AttorneysfurefndailtS=Respondents 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
- 16 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Don J. Hanson, attorney for the Respondents in 
the above-entitled action, hereby certify that on the'1.J_ciA 
day of May 1980, I served the attached Respondents' Brief 
upon Jonn T. Anderson, attorney for the Appellant, by 
depositing two copies thereof in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
John T. Anderson 
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